The Nobel Memorial Prize in favour of Daniel Kahneman Scandanavian Journal of Economics, 105(2): 157-280, 2003
Studying essentially Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated with a Model of Sin Taxes essentially (with Ted O’Donoghue), American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 93(2), essentially May 2003, 186-191.
Regulation essentially in favour of Conservatives: essentially Behavioral Economics and the Case in favour of Asymmetric essentially Paternalism, (with Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, essentially Ted O’Donoghue), University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol 151, No. 3, January essentially 2003, 1211-1254
Self Awareness and essentially Self Control (with Ted O’Donoghue), to be released as a chapter in Roy essentially Baumeister, George Loewenstein, and Daniel Read (eds.), Now or Later: Economic essentially and Psychological Perspectives on Intertemporal Choice, Russell Sage Foundation essentially Press, awaited.
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests (with Gary Charness), essentially Quarterly Journal of Economics 117(3), August 2002, 817-869.
‘Defending Expected Utility Theory’ -Response (with Richard Thaler), Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring 2002, 229-230.
Inference by fashion of essentially Believers in the Law of Small Numbers, Quarterly Journal of Economics essentially 117(3), August 2002, 775-816.
A Perspective on Psychology and Economics, European Economic Review 46(4-5), May 2002, 657-685.
Anomalies: Risk Aversion (with Richard Thaler), Journal of Economic Perspectives 15(1), Winter 2001, 219-232.
Risky Behavior Among Youths: Some Issues from Behavioral Economics (with Ted O’Donoghue), in Jon Gruber, rewrite inhibit, Youthful Risky Behavior: An Economic Perspective, University of Chicago Press and NBER, 2000.
Choice and Procrastination (with Ted O’Donoghue), Quarterly Journal of Economics, February 2001, 121-160.
Diminishing Marginal Utility of Wealth Cannot Explain Risk Aversion, chapter in Choices, Values, and Frames, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, editors, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000, 202-208.
The Economics of Immediate Gratification (with Ted O’Donoghue), Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 13(2), 233-250, 2000.
Choice Bracketing (with Daniel Read and George Loewenstein), Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19(1-3), 171-197, December 1999.
Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: essentially A Calibration Theorem, Econometrica 68(5), 1281-1292, September 2000.
Comment on `What Me Worry? A Psychological Perspective on Economic Aspects of Retirement,’ by fashion of George Loewenstein, Drazen Prelec, and Roberto Weber, in Behavioral Dimensions of Retirement Economics, Henry Aaron, rewrite inhibit, The Brookings Institution, 1999.
Procrastination in Preparing in favour of Retirement (with Ted O’Donoghue), in Behavioral Dimensions of Retirement Economics, Henry Aaron, rewrite inhibit, The Brookings Institution, 1999.
Incentives in favour of Procrastinators (with Ted O’Donoghue), Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(3), 769-816, August 1999.
Addiction and Self Control (with Ted O’Donoghue), in Addiction: Entries and Exits, Jon Elster, rewrite inhibit, Russel Sage Foundation, 1999.
Doing It Now or Later (with Ted O’Donoghue), American Economic Review 89(1), 103-124, March 1999.
Loss Aversion in a Consumption-Savings Model (with David Bowman and Deborah Minehart), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 38(2), 155-178, February 1999.
Psychology and Economics, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.
First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias (with Joel Schrag), Quarterly Journal of Economics 114(1), 37-82, February 1999. XXXVI, 11-46, March 1998. Abstract
Review of Arrow, K., Colombatto, E., Perlman, M. (eds.), The Rational Foundations of Economic Behaviour, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996, Journal of Economic Literature 35(4), 2045-2046, December 1997. and Schmidt, C.
Cheap Talk (with Joseph Farrell), Journal of Economic Perspectives 10(3), 103-118, Summer 1996.
Deviations, Dynamics, and Equilibrium Refinements (with Joel Sobel), Journal of Economic Theory 68(1), 1- 25, January 1996. 111-137.
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, in Warren Samuels (ed.), American Economists of the Late Twentieth Century, Cheltehem, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1996, pp.
A Model of Pre-Game Communication,Journal of Economic Theory 63, 370-391, August 1994.
Incorporating Behavioral Assumptions into Game Theory, in James Friedman (ed.), Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity, Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994.
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,American Economic Review 83, 1281-1302, December 1993.
Cognitive Dissonance and Social Change,Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 23, 177-194, 1994.
Information and the Control of Productive Assets,Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 9, 51-75, April 1993.
Communication between Rational Agents,Journal of Economic Theory 51, 144-170, June 1990.
110-1.)
Trends in British Health Inequalities, 1931-1983 (with Julian Le Grand), in A.J. (Corrigendum, 1992, Vol 58., pp. Culyer and Bengt Jonsson, editors, Public and Private Health Services, Basil Blackwell, 1986.
Unpublished Research
Incentives and Self Control (with Ted O’Donoghue), December 2005.
Reference-Dependent Risk Attitudes (with Botond Koszegi), November 2005.
The Gambler’s and Hot-Hand Fallacies In a essentially Dynamic-Inference Model (with Dimitri Vayanos), December 2005.
Procrastination on Long-Term Projects (with Ted O’Donoghue), February 2002.
Addiction and Present-Biased Preferences (with Ted O’Donoghue), October 2000. Abstract
Bargaining Structure, Fairness, and Efficiency, mimeo, June 1996.
Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility (with George Loewenstein and Ted O’Donoghue), March 2000. (Berkeley Department of Economics Working Paper). Abstract
Moral Preferences, Moral Constraints, and Self-Serving Biases, Berkeley Department of Economics Working Paper essentially No. Abstract
Fairness in Repeated Games, Berkeley Department of Economics Working Paper No. 95-241, August 1995. 97-252, January 1997.
Abstract
Focal Points in Pre-Game Communication, Berkeley Department of Economics Working Paper No. Abstract
Reneging and Renegotiation, Berkeley Department of Economics Working Paper No. 91-179, September 1991.